China Cancels All Trade Tariffs for Africa. Who Will Benefit?

On February 14, 2026, in a televised speech to the 39^th African Union (AU) Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the expansion of zero-tariff policy for African countries. He promised that from May 1, China would implement zero tariffs on the 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations (all but eSwatini, which maintains ties with Taiwan). The policy has since been explained by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi as part of China’s commitment to a further opening its markets and toward the goals of boosting trade, multiplying benefits for the people, and helping Africa to access the enormous opportunities of the Chinese market.

China and African nations have collectively fostered trade ties through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) across various levels of government since 2000. Examples of policy outcomes include a tariff-free policy offered by China since 2005 to Africa’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Under the policy some 33 African countries (qualification has varied over that time) have enjoyed tariff-free access to China. The United Nations classifies LDCs based on low per capita income, a low score on the Human Assets Index, and a high score in an index of overall economic and environmental vulnerability. Alongside, most exports from middle-income economies like South Africa and Morocco have consistently faced tariff rates of around 10-25%.

The Political Economy of Tariff Policy Change

An immediate driver of the policy shift appears to be contention around China’s staggering trade surplus, with Africa and globally. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference of February 2026 Director General of the World Trade Organisation, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, stated: “A trade surplus of US$1.2 trillion is unsustainable because the rest of the world cannot absorb such a large volume of trade. If China does not take action, we will see more trade barriers.”

By trade barriers, Dr Okonjo-Iweala was likely referring to trade tensions between China and the USA, but also between China and other high-income countries including countries in Western Europe, as well as Japan and Australia. In the case of the USA, trade tensions and erection of tariff barriers began in January 2018 when US President Donald Trump – prompted by the USA’s trade deficit with China - imposed tariffs on all imported washing machines and solar panels from the world, with Chinese exporters being especially impacted. A trade war between Australia and China began in May 2020 with China imposing tariffs on Australia’s barley exports and escalated over some months from there.

In the case of Africa, bilateral trade reached a record $US348bn in 2025, according to China’s General Administration of Custom. This reflected year-on-year growth of 17.7%. China’s exports to Africa reached US$225bn – up 25.8% and comprised mainly of manufactured goods. China’s imports from Africa reached $123bn, up 5.4%, and dominated by crude oil, copper, cobalt, and other mainly unprocessed commodities. It is not known, however, what share of the growth in China’s exports to Africa is driven by intra-Chinese company trade and payment transactions that do not impact the China-Africa balance of payments. In contrast, Africa enjoys a trade surplus of some E$US 32bn (depending on dataset and year of reference) in its $US385bn annual trade with its largest trading partner, the European Union.

Nonetheless, China is under pressure to demonstrate that it offers more than a voracious appetite for the continent’s natural resources. Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative since 2013 many African countries have taken advantage of new financing to invest in trade-related infrastructure like ports and key feeder roads. If these do not lead to elevated export opportunity alongside productivity growth, it will be more costly to pay back these loans.

So why has China chosen to forgo an estimated $US1.4bn in annual tariff revenue from Africa – not least a time when Chinese traders themselves are having to pay tariffs to trade with the world’s biggest economy and greatest importer, the USA?

The Logic of China’s Zero Tariff Offer

A first point is that countries that do not benefit from current tariff-free policy include Africa’s stronger exporters to China, or are LDCs exporting raw commodities that are either tariff-free or for which demand is little impacted by a tariff. The top five exporters in Africa to China, according to Chinese customs data are: South Africa, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo and Zambia. Of these only DRC and Zambia are LDCs, while non-minerals exports from South Africa, like fruits and wines, are slapped with tariffs. Equivalently, some of Africa’s more dynamic (and middle-income) economies like Kenya, incur tariffs on their main exports to China, including tea, coffee, horticulture, avocadoes and seafood. In 2015, Johnston, Morgan and Wang already pointed to the relative lack of trade policy support from China for Africa’s stronger and frontier coastal economies.

Moreover, growth of agricultural and processed agricultural exports to China would not only support China’s recently elevated food security priorities (including import diversification) but would also achieve multiple goals in the China-Africa context. For example, it would foster the FOCAC agenda of supporting poverty alleviation since growth of rural productivity tends to support rural area incomes and opportunity (in regions home to the greatest depth and incidence of poverty). This would support food security in Africa, while elevating exports and in theory narrowing the enormous trade deficit. It may also boost African exports to China against third market exports by, for example, removing tariffs on South African wine while tariffs on Californian and Australian wine to China stay constant.

In the African trade and development context, there are important implications arising from the upcoming tariff policy shift. Only a small number of studies have explored the impact of China-Africa tariff policies. My own PhD study of China’s imports from Africa included a variable for LDC trade preferences, and found no significant early impact on import levels (up to 2009). Over a longer period Sun and Omoruyi (2021) found that the LDC tariff benefits had promoted diversification of manufacturing exports to China and also regional trade, but had had little impact on agricultural and mining diversification. These authors called for three policy shifts: 1) expansion of trade benefits across regional groupings in Africa to allow cross-country collaboration to achieve trade objectives; 2) focus on elimination of non-tariff barriers like customs processes and phytosanitary barriers and costs; 3) elevated Chinese support for African countries to improve their exports and production capacity.

China’s new universal zero-tariff policy is a step in that direction in that it equalises tariff treatment across countries and hence regional groupings. This empowers cross-country cooperation in investment for export production (to China). This also feeds into Africa’s own regional integration and trade agenda under the AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Area), which began implementation in 2019.

Further, China is offering elevated trade facilitation support. Examples include an upgrading of “green channel” and customs procedures. “Green lanes” allow streamlined inspection and quarantine and customs clearances, and can include simplified documentation, faster phytosanitary checks, and priority processing at ports.

There is nonetheless a risk that consistent tariff treatment merely facilitates the continent’s stronger economies and export prospects, such as Morocco, Egypt and South Africa. Where economies like Kenya and Ghana may benefit somewhat, there is a risk that LDCs gain least, and even get squeezed. That is, more industrialised nations like South Africa can squeeze the prospects of countries like Malawi. On the other hand, Malawi may in the end benefit more from regional cooperation with a richer South Africa than from more direct access to China. The net impacts will only be known over time and also be a product of cross-country and regional policy responses.

Finally, another driver for the zero-tariff shift is that for China, Africa is becoming increasingly important as an economic partner. Not only are China’s traditional sizeable export markets – the USA and Europe – under pressure and facing elevated trade barriers, but China has also recently elevated the “material security” under safeguarding national economic security. In other words, ensuring supply of inputs like copper and lithium that are required to power China’s economy now have an elevated place in its national security agenda. That is, in an era of great powers contest, mitigating risks to food security, energy and resource supply security is more important to China than ever. Given the importance of Africa to certain global and Chinese supply chains, China-Africa trade ties are hence more important to China than ever.

Tariffs are no Panacea for Development

A caveat to China’s welcome tariff shift is the reality that tariff alleviation does not equate to trade-related transformation. For example, zero tariffs on cocoa beans or unprocessed copper mean little if demand in China does not change despite the resulting reduction in price . Moreover, even if the export of chocolate or batteries would now be tariff-free, if African countries are not producing these goods, at least to Chinese export standard, then the tariff change will not have any impact. In fact, it is not likely that the tariff was the main obstacle to fostering such industries.

The race for Africa’s minerals supplies to power new industries and a process of electrification in response to climate change and oil supply constraints in light of the crisis in the Hormuz Strait, in theory places African nations in a newly powerful and important negotiating position . At the same time, simple export of these raw commodities to China and elsewhere, risks repeating the past – a past in which African economies did not industrialise alongside their trade partners. China’s tariff offer is a welcome - it could add impetus to African exports to China beyond unprocessed commodities and is especially helpful to economies that are best positioned to response to zero-tariff access. The policy shift in isolation, however, is not the key to Africa’s development.