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  • 08/2024
  • Moazzam Malik

British Development Policy: What Changes should the New Government Implement?

A renowned expert on foreign and development policy recommends a relaunch of institutions after the Labour victory – including a development bank.

British emergency aid in Mocambique after cyclone Idai in 2019. Humanitarian aid from London receded by 20 percent compared to the previous year. © WFP/Rein Skullerud via DIFD Flickr

In Fourth Place Among OECD Donors

With Official Development Aid of 19,1 billion Dollars (15,4 billion Pounds) Great Britain in 2023 was in fourth place among industrialized nations and reached an ODA quota of 0,58 percent of Gross National Income (GNI). The share of costs for domestic refugees rose to 28 percent of ODA. Humanitarian aid receded by 20 percent compared to the previous year. Observers see little financial leeway for the new Labour government to raise its development aid budget significantly.

DFID (Department for International Development) – an integrated development ministry – was an effective and innovative organisational model (it was closed down in June 2020 under Prime Minister Boris Johnson). But it was rooted in its time in the immediate post-cold-war era. In the mid/late 2020s, in an increasingly multi-polar world where the UK is a declining share of the global economy and trust between the 'west' and the Global South has hit a low, a values-led development offer is simply not credible with partners.

FCDO (Foreign & Commonwealth Development Office) – a fully integrated foreign and development affairs ministry – was put together in haste and has struggled. Foreign affairs priorities have trumped development with a consequent shift to a shorter-term focus, less attention to underlying evidence and impact, a reduction in overall staff numbers working on development, an erosion of expertise, and incentives for top talent to shift from development to wider foreign affairs. The loss of influence in the development space was significantly accelerated by declining ODA (Official Development Aid) budgets and rapidly growing refugee related costs.

Looking ahead, what might an appropriate UK development offer look like? This insight piece seeks to prompt debate on the shape of the UK's future international development and climate offer.

A need for clarity on the UK’s objectives:

What does this mean for how the UK's development offer is structured?

I. Integrated oversight of international affairsincluding development and climate change in one ministry to ensure policy coherence: this implies integrated political oversight, strategy setting and decision-making on policy and 'wholesale' spend choices (ie funding allocations to multilateral and bilateral programme priorities) with political accountability running through a Cabinet level International Climate and Development Secretary and full accounting officer responsibilities for all ODA spend (including staffing) running through a 2nd Permanent Secretary. They would operate alongside the Foreign Secretary and Permanent Secretary and within the framework of the International Development Act.

II. A multi-instrument bilateral delivery model for development and climate action - managed as a coherent group of "retail" agencies with the balance of staff overseas rather than in the UK - to create sustained impact:

a) British International Cooperation - a new bilateral agency to manage UK aid grants to support development and climate related technical assistance in selected low income (and potentially lower middle income) countries and bilateral humanitarian assistance. Overseas staff would continue to operate from embassies. The case for a new agency rests on:

b) British International Investment Bank – a development bank, building out of BII (British International Investment – and potentially the UK Infrastructure Bank) with borrowing rights in capital markets so that aggregate investment flows are a multiple of government ODA injections.

The case for a development bank rests on:

c) British Council – a clear mandate and resource settlement (including non-ODA funding) to focus on promoting cultural and educational partnerships overseas.

d) Westminster (rename as “British”) Foundation for Democracy – an expanded mandate and resources to focus on strengthening governance, human rights and democratic settlements internationally.

III. A medium term commitment to spend at least 1% GNI (Gross National Income) for planned international spending inclusive of ODA – sitting alongside the commitment to spend 2% for defence – to deliver UK international priorities. Any major unplanned expenditure should be a draw on the treasury reserve as is the case for unforeseen military/security operations.

This article was first published by ODI (Overseas Development Institute) global affairs thinktank.

Moazzam Malik University College London Policy Lab

Moazzam Malik is Managing Director for Global Delivery at World Resources Institute (WRI). He is a former Director General in FCDO and DFID and British Ambassador to Indonesia and the ASEAN. He recently co-authored The World in 2040: Renewing the UK’s Approach to International Affairs’ with support from ODI's Mark Miller amongst others.

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