Despite Offers of International Aid Food Security in North Korea Remains Critical
Trade with China is resuming, Russia and the FAO are offering help. But the regime in Pyongyang insists on self-sufficiency.
Food security in North Korea remains critical. In summer 2023 food supplies were already so precarious due to weather-related crop failures and years of isolation due to COVID-19 measures, that experts compared the situation to the county´s most severe famine in the 1990s. Two years later, the situation is unlikely to have improved much.
In March 2025, during the 58th session of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in North Korea, Elizabeth Salmón, highlighted this alarming situation. Despite North Korea´s effort to increase domestic food production, around half the population, some 12 million people, remain undernourished. “Reports indicate instances of starvation during the border shutdown and possibly more to come during the harvest gap in spring,“ Salmón warned. The most affected are the elderly, the sick and people without savings in rural areas.
Extreme weather events continue to occur in North Korea, further exacerbating the already precarious food situation. According to a report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), floods in the summers of 2023 and 2024 were particularly severe. During this time, above-average, almost tropical temperatures were also recorded. This has intensified the risk of increased pest infestations and disease outbreaks, leading to lower crop yields. The damage was not only limited to agriculture but also extended to buildings and roads. According to estimates by South Korean authorities, the floods resulted in 1,100 to 1,500 dead or missing persons.
International trade can only partially compensate for crop failures. While the borders with China have reopened for the movement of goods, imports from China amounted to only around 210 million dollars in 2024, according to China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC). This is down from approximately $250 million in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic. One possible reason for this decline is that imports have become more expensive due to the collapse of the North Korean currency.
Bad weather and arbitrary political decisions
However, hunger is not only caused by bad weather, but also a result of arbitrary political decisions. “The Government’s public distribution system is discriminatory and irregular,” criticized UN Human Rights Commissioner Salmón. “Only those loyal to the leadership receive regular public distribution.”
Poor decisions and political ideology also weigh heavily on food security. For instance, the strict border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic blocked trade with China, leading to an acute shortage of staple foods. In response to this crisis, the regime increasingly restricted private market activities and pushed for the expansion of state-run grocery stores.
In January 2023, the government imposed a complete ban on sales of certain foods in local markets. Staple foods such as rice and corn have since then only been available in state-run stores. For private businesses, this marked the first restriction since 2003, when black markets, known as Janmadang, were legalized.
With the sales ban, the government aimed to prevent people from reselling illegally obtained state food rations at inflated prices. Given the scarcity of supply, this has become highly lucrative: prices for rice and corn reached record highs last year. According to the South Korean information service Daily NK, the price of rice in the capital, Pyongyang, on February 16, 2025, was 8,300 North Korean won per kilogram, nearly double the price of December 2023 (4,300 won). Even for corn, the more affordable staple food particularly favored by poorer households in North Korea, prices increased from 2,100 won in December 2023 to 3,120 won in February 2025.
Russia´s aid had little impact on improving food security
The new partnership with Russia has not significantly improved North Korea´s food security until now. Since Russia´s invasion of Ukraine, relations between Russia and North Korea have strengthened considerably. To meet Russia´s massive demand for ammunition and weapons, President Vladimir Putin turned to North Korea´s leader Kim Jong Un. Since at least 2023, Kim Jong Un has been sending arms to Russia, and since 2024, soldiers as well. According to an analysis by North Korea expert Olena Guseinova for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the weapons delivered until October 2024 alone were worth up to $5.5 billion.
However, it remains unclear how Putin will return the favor for this support: presumably, with a mixture of capital, technological know-how, materials and food. Despite concerns about the deepening military and economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia, South Korea's former Defense Minister Shin Won-sik viewed the Russian food shipments as an opportunity to stabilize prices in North Korea in early 2024.
A few months later, however, Peter Ward, an expert on the North Korean economy at the Sejong Institute in Seoul, drew a different conclusion: Russian agricultural shipments had "no significant impact on North Korea's food security." For him, the record prices for grains, even after food imports from Russia, serve as an indicator of ongoing food shortages and reduced availability of staple foods in the country. He emphasized that imports of corn and wheat flour were minimal.
North Korea´s pursuit of self-sufficiency further complicates external aid efforts. After the devastating floods in July 2024, Putin offered humanitarian assistance to North Korea, but Kim declined. The North Korean leader emphasized that his country was fully capable of overcoming the crisis without external help. Similarly, in 2023, Kim rejected Russia's offer of 50,000 tons of wheat as a donation, arguing that the food situation in North Korea had already improved.
According to Hong Min, a scholar at the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU), North Korea seeks to project an image of being independent and not reliant on foreign aid. By publicly disclosing the aid offer, however, the country likely intended to emphasize its close ties with Russia.
FAO visit and role of the UN
Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions, the international community continues to engage with North Korea and provide assistance. This is demonstrated by the visit of FAO Director-General Qu Dongyu in July 2024. During his visit, Qu emphasized the need to improve North Korea´s agricultural production and promote more resilient farming techniques in order to reduce the impact of natural disasters and climate change.
The FAO aims to assist North Korea not only with agricultural technology, but also by providing urgently needed equipment and fertilizers to enhance agricultural productivity and stabilize food production. However, international sanctions complicate the acquisition of these resources, further exacerbating the already difficult situation.
In January 2025, the UN granted exemptions to send aid shipments to North Korea despite the existing sanction. This allowed the FAO to provide technical support for better feed production and wheat and barley cultivation, as reported by the UN Security Council. The total value of the delivery is 158,000 dollar and includes tractors and sowing machines. The Security Council also permitted UNICEF to bring in materials and equipment, particularly for health and sanitation facilities, including cold chain technology, steel, and vehicles.
However, critical voices question the effectiveness and transparency of FAO´s aid efforts in North Korea. Some experts such as Andrew Natsios, former head of the US Agency for International Development(USAID), accuse the FAO of unintentionally strengthening North Korea´s authoritarian regime. They argue that supporting agricultural projects could enable the government to expand its control rather ensuring that aid reaches those in need.
In addition, international aid efforts are difficult to monitor on the ground because no UN organization is currently allowed to operate in the country, as noted by Elizabeth Salmón before the Human Rights Council.
The debate over sanction exceptions is not new: progressive voices in South Korea and the US argue that humanitarian aid serves to foster dialogue and people-to-people exchange and can also contribute to the country´s modernization and development. In contrast, conservative critics warn that technical support and other exceptions undermine the sanctions regime and may benefit the state apparatus rather than the broader population.
It remains to be hoped that the visit of the FAO Director-General and the sanctions exemptions have facilitated a pathway toward deeper cooperation between North Korea and the international community. Such developments could potentially lay the groundwork for future negotiations that address not only the ongoing food crisis but also more sensitive political matters, such as the possible end of North Korea's weapons program.
