Central African Republic: When One Crisis Reinforces Another
Manifold challenges in the country hinder efforts to counter poverty, hunger and displacement - and undermine human security.
All views expressed in the Welternährung are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view or policies of the editorial board or of Welthungerhilfe.
The Central African Republic is often introduced through its crises: conflict, hunger, displacement, weak services, climate shocks and underdevelopment. Yet before speaking about crisis, one must first speak about the country itself. CAR is a vast, landlocked country at the heart of the African continent, covering about 623,000 square kilometres (comparable in size to Ukraine or Afghanistan), with a small and widely dispersed population of about 5,5 million. It sits between the humid forests of the Congo Basin in the south and the savannas that open towards the Sahel in the north, with rivers feeding both the Ubangi-Congo system and the Lake Chad basin. It is a country of forests, wildlife, fertile land, water, minerals and striking ecological diversity.
I have returned to this country three times in my professional life: first in September 2016 with Concern Worldwide, then from February 2018 to January 2020 with Cordaid, and again from July 2024 as Country Director for Welthungerhilfe. I say “returned” deliberately. CAR is not an assignment one simply passes through. It stays with you. I often say, with both affection and frustration, that this is a place where Murphy’s law feels less like a joke than a planning assumption: what can go wrong often does, and usually at the worst possible time. But that is only one side of the story. The other side is the patience, humour and resilience of people who keep going despite conditions that would exhaust many societies.
From inside the country, the usual categories rarely appear separately. They meet in the same household, on the same road, in the same market and in the same decision a family must make: whether to cultivate or move, whether to sell a goat to pay for transport to a health centre or to a market, whether to send a child to school or keep food for the evening.
Polycrisis: History and Reality
The current crisis did not begin in one moment, but the 2013–2014 collapse remains a decisive turning point. The Séléka rebel alliance advance on Bangui, the fall of President François Bozizé in March 2013, the rise of “anti-balaka” groups opposing the Séléka and the 2014 transition transformed long-standing grievances into national rupture. MINUSCA (the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic) was authorised by the UN Security Council in April 2014, with protection of civilians at the centre of its mandate and a role in facilitating humanitarian access. More than a decade later, the country has undeniably changed: state authority has been extended in several areas, national institutions are functioning, elections have taken place, and communities continue to rebuild. Yet the crisis has not disappeared. It has changed shape.
This is what the polycrisis looks like in concrete terms: Insecurity on a road does not only create fear; it raises transport costs. Higher transport costs affect food prices. When food prices rise, families reduce meals, sell productive assets or delay health care. When families are displaced, host communities share already limited water, land, food and services. When roads are damaged or unsafe, humanitarian teams arrive late, traders hesitate, public services struggle to function and farmers lose access to markets. Climate shocks then add another pressure to households that have already lost savings, livestock, seeds or tools.
I have seen food systems in CAR remain fragile, improve, and then fall again. That is perhaps one of the hardest parts of working here: progress is real, but it is rarely linear. A community may recover enough to cultivate again, only for insecurity, flooding, a fuel shortage or a blocked road to undo months of effort. Recently, after a security incident in Vakaga in the north of CAR, affecting humanitarian colleagues, what stayed with me was not only the operational disruption, but the human weight of such moments: the shaken staff member, the families waiting for assistance, the questions from communities, the need to continue while also acknowledging fear. Access, in such contexts, is never an abstract word. It is the thin line between presence and absence.
Multiple Causes of Food Insecurity
Food insecurity in CAR is therefore not only about production. The IPC’s April–August 2026 update estimates that more than two million people, nearly one in three, are experiencing high acute food insecurity, including 262’000 people in Emergency phase. Persistent conflict, displacement, high prices, weak purchasing power and poor roads all constrain access to food.
Welthungerhilfe works across the Central African Republic on food and nutrition security, resilient agriculture and seed systems, livelihoods, humanitarian assistance, water sanitation and health, and the strengthening of civil society and local institutions since 2014. Its programmes seek to connect immediate support to vulnerable communities with longer-term resilience, working closely with national and local partners, community structures and public institutions.
Today, insecurity in CAR is less characterised by a single national front line than by highly localised dynamics. Armed-group activity, criminality and road banditry, competition over territory and natural resources, tensions linked to seasonal migration, and spillovers from conflicts in neighbouring countries all contribute to insecurity. On remote roads, limited state presence and weak communications can make communities, traders and humanitarian movements particularly vulnerable to robbery, ambushes and temporary disruption.
For those of us working with rural communities, this is very real. A harvest matters, but so does the road from the field to the market; the price of fuel; the safety of the axis; the availability of seeds; the trust between herders and farmers; and whether women can participate in local economic life.
There is also a danger in speaking about the Central African Republic only as a humanitarian emergency. It can make communities appear passive, when in fact they are constantly adapting, negotiating and rebuilding. Farmers continue to plant. Women’s groups organise savings and small trade. Local leaders mediate tensions. National NGOs reach communities where international actors may not be present. These efforts should not be romanticised; resilience is not a substitute for rights, services or protection. But it is important to see that the country is not defined only by crisis. It is also defined by the daily effort of people to remain standing.
Substantive Government Framework
The government has responded through important frameworks. The National Development Plan 2024–2028 succeeds the earlier recovery and peacebuilding framework and was developed through consultation with government, technical and financial partners, the private sector, civil society and communities. The National Strategy on Durable Solutions for internally displaced persons and returnees also reflects a recognition that displacement cannot be managed indefinitely as a temporary emergency. Recent public-finance reform discussions point in the same direction: without stronger domestic revenue, better public financial management and greater investment in human capital, the state’s ability to finance development will remain constrained.
A fair counterargument is that progress is real and should be acknowledged. Parts of the country are more stable than during the peak years of the crisis. The humanitarian caseload has declined in some planning cycles. The state, supported by partners, is trying to reconnect emergency response with recovery and development. Donors are also under pressure globally and cannot finance every crisis at previous levels. These points are valid. But they become dangerous if they lead to the conclusion that CAR can be deprioritised too quickly. A lower humanitarian appeal can reflect prioritisation and funding constraints, not only reduced vulnerability.
Preventing Reduction of Humanitarian Aid
International donors and humanitarian actors therefore remain essential. The 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan seeks US$264.1 million to assist 1.3 million of the most vulnerable people. The European Union estimates that 2.3 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2026 and has allocated €22 million in humanitarian aid to the country. This support matters, including for logistics such as UNHAS (United Nations Humanitarian Air Service), because in CAR access is not an administrative detail. It is often the difference between a programme that can listen, monitor and respond, and one that exists only on paper.
Yet the international response also faces difficult questions. Humanitarian actors are being asked to prioritise more sharply. Development actors are encouraged to arrive earlier. Peace and security actors are asked to support stabilisation while gradually enabling national ownership. None of this is wrong. But sequencing matters. If humanitarian support is withdrawn before basic services, local markets, livelihoods and state capacity are ready to carry the load, progress can collapse. The issue is not “humanitarian or development”. In many parts of CAR, it must be humanitarian where needed, development layered early, and resilience built throughout.
Localisation is one of the most important opportunities in this transition. It should not mean simply transferring risk to national NGOs or subcontracting activities at lower cost. Local actors bring operational knowledge: they know which roads are becoming unsafe, when market prices are changing, which families are newly displaced, which tensions are emerging between communities and where women-led organisations are being excluded. Meaningful localisation requires information, resources, influence and accountability. A seat at the table matters; the ability to shape the decision matters more.
Stabilisation on Many Levels
The Central African Republic also challenges assumptions about state restoration. Research by Tim Glawion and others have repeatedly shown that military control alone does not create lasting legitimacy. People expect security, but also justice, belonging, services, roads, schools, health care and jobs. This is one of the most important lessons for external partners. Stabilisation cannot be measured only by a flag raised in a town. It must be measured by whether communities feel safer, whether children learn, whether farmers sell, whether displaced families can return voluntarily and whether public authority is experienced as service rather than extraction.
What, then, should be done? First, humanitarian assistance must remain principled, targeted and adequately funded, especially in areas where acute vulnerability remains high. Second, development investment must reach beyond easily accessible zones and connect infrastructure to rural livelihoods, food systems, women’s economic empowerment and local markets. Third, food security programming must be understood as a systems agenda: seeds, land, roads, storage, processing, climate adaptation, social cohesion and purchasing power all matter. Fourth, localisation must become a transfer of capacity and influence, not just implementation responsibility. Finally, government reform efforts need sustained support, but also honest dialogue about territorial coverage, accountability and public resources.
CAR’s polycrisis is not a chain of separate emergencies. It is a system in which each shock can intensify the others. But systems can also be changed. A safe road can reduce food prices. A functioning health centre can prevent a household from selling its last asset. A local organisation with resources can detect a crisis before it becomes visible in national data. A development programme arriving at the right moment can protect what humanitarian action kept alive.
The lesson from the Central African Republic is therefore both sobering and hopeful. Sobering, because fragile gains can be reversed if the country is treated as yesterday’s crisis. Hopeful, because the way forward is visible: protect the humanitarian floor, invest in local systems, support accountable public services, strengthen resilient food systems and listen seriously to the communities who live the polycrisis every day. Above all, it means remembering that behind every category — IDP, host community, farmer, returnee, trader, child, local partner — there is a person trying to hold together a future in a country that deserves to be seen not only for its crises, but also for its courage.
References:
This article draws on field reflections from the author’s work in the Central African Republic, including assignments with Concern Worldwide, Cordaid and Welthungerhilfe. Humanitarian and food-security data draw on the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for the Central African Republic, as referenced in European Commission humanitarian reporting, the IPC’s Central African Republic: Acute Food Security Situation Projection Update, April–August 2026, and the European Commission’s humanitarian reporting on the Central African Republic.
Background on the establishment and mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) draws on UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014) and the MINUSCA Factsheet.
Discussion of national development planning draws on the Central African Republic National Development Plan 2024–2028, while the analysis of public-finance constraints is informed by the World Bank’s Central African Republic Public Finance Review and its accompanying Summary for Policy Makers.
Reflections on state authority, legitimacy, stabilisation and local perceptions draw particularly on Tim Glawion, Jaïr van der Lijn and Nikki de Zwaan, Securing Legitimate Stability in CAR: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives (SIPRI, 2019).
