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  • Business & Human Rights
  • 10/2025
  • Olayinka Idowu Kareem
Focus Area

The Reality of EU-Africa Trade Relations

The two sides are far from being preferential partners. Their trade with other regions of the world is more extensive, the balance a disappointment. What are the reasons?

The Africa Phytosanitary Programme (APP) trains producers of ornamental plants in phytosanitary regulations and export inspections. © IPPC / International Plant Protection Convention via Flickr

All views expressed in the Welternährung are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view or policies of the editorial board or of Welthungerhilfe.

1. Introduction

The economic interaction between Europe and Africa is traced back to the precolonial and colonial periods, when Africa served as a veritable source of raw materials for the European industrial sector (Kareem, 2011). This economic relationship gradually tilted towards trade interactions. Trade relations between the European Union (EU) and Africa continue to date, particularly between those countries that have had a colonial affinity. This is one of the bases for the assertion that the EU is “Africa’s traditional trade partner”. The initial structure and pattern of the trade relations fall within the scope of inter-industry trade, where trade took place across different industries and products, e.g. Africa exported raw commodities to the EU and imported finished and semi-finished goods. This was characteristic of the pre- and early post-independence periods for many African countries, where the EU conducted about one-tenth of its total trade with Africa, while about half of Africa’s total trade was with the EU (IMF IMTS, 2025) (See figures 1 and 2).

However, the discovery of mineral resources, e.g. crude oil, in commercial quantities in Africa adversely affected the agri-food systems, thereby de-prioritising the sector in its development agenda, even though the bulk of the population is engaged in it. This led to the threat of severe food insecurity in many countries (Kareem et al., 2025). Moreover, the then-nascent extractive industries demanded huge investment in capital-intensive production. To overcome this food insecurity and to acquire the equipment required for production, there is a need for imports, which were largely from the EU. Besides, the African population increased almost sevenfold, from 228 million in 1950 to over 1.5 billion in 2024 (UNCTADstat, 2025), necessitating increased imports from the EU.

This extended the trade structure between the EU and Africa to intra- and inter-industry trade. The intensity and extensiveness of EU exports to Africa, particularly of machinery, are essential for the development and expansion of the real sector. However, agri-food export to Africa is a double-edged sword: it supports the continent’s resilience to food insecurity, but at the same time has consequences for domestic agri-food systems (see Kareem, 2025; Shiferaw and Di Ciommon, 2023).

Despite the preponderance of EU agri-food exports to Africa, in addition to manufactured and intermediate goods, the EU’s trade share with Africa has plummeted over the years. EU exports, particularly agri-foods, have faced tremendous safeguard measures in Africa because heavily subsidised EU agri-food exports have distorted domestic market prices. Although the EU remains Africa’s main and traditional trade partner, EU market access conditions have impacted Africa’s export performance, so that Africa has been redirecting its trade to Asian countries, particularly to China and India. However, there is now an opportunity for realignment, especially at this time when there are multiple global crises and the US, which is the EU's main trade partner, is imposing restrictive and punitive trade policy measures, particularly mega and prohibitive tariffs. The EU and Africa can leverage their traditional economic relations to expand trade interactions. Africa has a large market that the EU can explore to redirect its trade, as an alternative to the US market, and complementing other third-party negotiated trade agreements, including recently with the Latin American Mercosur, India, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates. The EU should also provide an enabling trade policy environment for Africa to ensure a win-win situation.

2. The Context

The topicality of EU-Africa trade relations cannot be overemphasised and has been enunciated by Langan (2024) and Kareem (2025). The strengthening of trade relations between these two regions has never been more important than now, when there are catastrophic global crises. These global crises, such as climate change, the war in Ukraine and the increasingly restrictive global trading system, especially the deliberalisation of US trade policies, have led to geopolitical realignment. The consequences of these global crises are volatility in the balance of payments, recessions, supply chain disruptions, unemployment, food price hikes, and food insecurity. These challenges point to the need for the EU and Africa to deepen their trade relations through enabling trade policy environments that would foster and facilitate trade for inclusive and sustainable development.

On one hand, the EU is Africa’s classical and longest-established trade partner with various trade arrangements and agreements, including the Everything but Arms Scheme, the Lome Agreements, the Generalised Scheme of Preferences, the Cotonou and subsequent Samoa Agreements, numerous Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as well as various Association Agreements. On the other hand, Africa is the EU’s fourth-largest trade partners, aside from the United States, China, and the United Kingdom (European Council and Council of the EU, 2025). The bulk of these trade agreements was based on preferential trade for Africa to stimulate and enhance market access.

Although in absolute value terms, Africa’s trade with the EU is increasing, however, it is decreasing in its share of Africa’s total trade. Moreover, Africa’s export performance has been oscillating and unimpressive in the past two decades. For instance, the share of Africa’s exports to the EU increased from about 39% of total exports in 1950 to 50% in 1985, which afterwards plummeted to 29% in 2024 (IMF IMTS, 2025). The same trend was shown in the share of Africa’s total trade with the EU, which rose from 37% in 1950 of total trade to 49% in 1985 and later decreased to about 27% in 2024 (IMF IMTS, 2025).

Figure 1: EU Share of Africa’s Total Trade

Source: Computed © Kareem

Figure 2: Africa’s Share of EU Total Trade

Source: Computed © Kareem

Similarly, the share of EU trade with Africa has been on a downward trend, decreasing from 10% in 1950 to about 3% in 2024. This EU-Africa trade trend sheds light on the depletion in market access across the two regions, despite the commitment shown through different trade arrangements and agreements to strengthen trade relations.

Furthermore, the trade structure in EU-Africa trade relations indicates that Africa mainly exports raw commodities to the EU, while it imports food products, machinery and manufactured goods. For instance, EU food imports from Africa almost quadrupled between 1995 and 2024, rising from about $9 billion in 1995 to $34 billion in 2024, while its food products’ export to Africa more than tripled, reaching $24 billion in 2024 from about $7 billion in 1995 (UNCTADstat, 2025). Further, the EU largely imports primary commodities from Africa, given the continent’s huge deposits of mineral resources, such that its commodities’ import more than quadrupled between 1995 and 2024, rising from $33 billion to $145 billion.

Figure 3: EU-Africa Food Trade

Source: Computed © Kareem

Figure 4: EU-Africa Primary Commodity Trade

Source: Computed © Kareem

However, EU exports of machinery and transport equipment to Africa rose from $17 billion in 1995 to over $60 billion in 2024. Also, it exported manufactured goods worth over $116 billion in 2024 to Africa, up from $34 billion in 1995 (UNCTADstat, 2025), an increase of 241%, indicating the intensity of the EU's intermediate and finished products export to Africa.

Figure 5: EU-Africa Machinery & Transport Equipment Trade

Source: Computed © Kareem

Figure 6: EU-Africa Manufactured Goods Trade

Source: Computed © Kareem

The dwindling in Africa’s market access to the EU was, in part, attributed to the proliferation of stringent trade policy measures by the EU. Extensive and sophisticated sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) imposed in the EU market are challenges for Africa, given the level of science and technology development, deficient quality infrastructure and inadequate investment and development finance. Besides, the increasing activation of the precautionary principle in SPS/TBT agreements as well as continuous subsidies and supports also distorted fair competition in both the EU market and in African domestic markets.

Beyond that, the Farm-to-Fork and Biodiversity Strategies in the EU Green Deal have been shown to have detrimental consequences for Africa (Foote, 2022; Fox, 2022; Usman et al., 2021; Dekeyser and Woolfrey, 2021). EU Deforestation Regulations (EUDR) have contributed to Africa’s lacklustre agri-food exports performance, thereby impacting the extent to which African countries can achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Recent regulatory frameworks such as the Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directives (CSDDD), Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulations (ESPR) could have short- and medium-term adverse consequences for market access. Similarly, protectionist trade policies in Africa and African countries’ foot dragging and reluctance to rectify negotiated trade agreements, particularly EPAs, have affected the EU's propensity to access the African market.

Furthermore, the ‘aid for trade’ given to Africa is believed to be used by the EU as an instrument of geoeconomic policy to pressure African governments into accepting reciprocal EPAs (Langan, 2024). Concerns have been raised about the implications of EPAs for African domestic industries and government tariff revenues. The experiences of African countries that are implementing an interim EPA have not been conducive to emulation by other countries, e.g. Ghana’s poultry and tomato subsectors (Kareem, 2019a). Thus, the idea of ‘aid for trade’ seems impractical for Africa’s development aspirations, particularly for economic diversification. Instead of development “aid for trade”, the EU should tweak and rejig its stringent trade policies impacting Africa’s market access and crowding out African producers not only in their domestic market but also in third-country markets.

3. A Look into the Future

Given that the EU has shown the desire to support sustainable development in Africa (Shiferaw and Di Ciommon, 2023) and engaged with the continent on an ‘equal partnership’ basis (Fox, 2025), it is expected to ‘practice the talk’ or ‘act the talk’ (Kareem, 2025). This is by considering Africa’s developmental level, particularly the marginal propensity to adopt technology and innovation for compliance with EU market access conditions. Besides, reducing the activation of the precautionary principle in SPS/TBT agreements (Kareem, 2019b) will expand Africa’s export to the EU, which in turn stems the tide of Africans taking the dangerous migration route to the EU. Also, promoting fair competition by ensuring domestically subsidised food products are not exported to the African market.

Furthermore, as a matter of “international social responsibility” (Kareem, 2025) and the “right to trade” (Stiglitz and Chalton, 2019), the EU can reduce the extensive application of WTO obligations and sustainability regulations as part of its green transition whenever they deeply affect Africa’s sustainable development. EU policy tweaking in this regard is largely preferable to the extant ‘aid for trade’. Undertaking this policy repurposing will strengthen Africa’s belief in the reality of the EU’s commitment to its sustainable development. This will deepen the EU’s trade market share in Africa and reduce the increasing influence of China, India and Russia on African trade and market space.

Nevertheless, the achievement of sustainable market access in Africa, particularly for the EU, in part depends on African governments’ commitment to the implementation of various inclusive and developmental policy architectures that are largely home-grown and fit domestically alongside technological and innovative support from development partners, such as the EU. Moreover, Africa must be able and willing to finance its development to a large extent and invest in science, technology and quality infrastructure to upgrade its exports. EU-Africa trade relations can be strengthened through the full implementation of the established development partnership platforms, such as the EU-Africa Joint Vision for 2030, Africa-Europe Foundation, and the EU’s Horn of Africa new regional strategy.

4. Conclusion

Europe-Africa trade relations predate the independence of many African countries. Trade agreements became inevitable to continue promoting trade as African countries gained independence. However, in the past few decades, mutual trade shares have been decreasing at an increasing rate, as the EU embraced green development transition and activated sophisticated trade and sustainability policies, while Africa plays the victim. This has led to unimpressive trade performance, despite the “commitment to trade” rhetoric. The current global crises, including prohibitive US trade policies, should motivate the trade partners to spice up and strengthen the implementation of progressive trade partnerships and improve trade performance. Both trade partners need to renegotiate a mutually beneficial and progressive trade agreement for the benefit of the people of both regions.

Olayinka Idowu Kareem is a researcher at the University of Hohenheim, Germany, und and at the Market Access Policy Research Network, Nigeria.

Olayinka Idowu Kareem University of Hohenheim, Germany

References

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